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In the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged
what never before existed: a truly global morality. That morality, which
I call “the morality of human rights,” consists not only of various rights
recognized by the great majority of the countries of the world as human
rights but also of a fundamental imperative that directs “all human
beings” to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The
imperative—articulated in the very first article of the foundational human
rights document of our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR)1—is fundamental in the sense that, as I later explain, it serves,
in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights.
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1. Article I of the UDHR states, “All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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My discussion of the morality of human rights in this Article presupposes
that the reader is familiar with the internationalization of human rights:
the growing international recognition and protection, in the period since
the end of the Second World War, of certain rights as human rights.
The Appendix to this Article is for readers not familiar with the
internationalization of human rights.2
I begin, in the first Part of the Article, by explaining what the term
human right means in the context of the internationalization of human
rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in
some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights
are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second Part, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal
concern in this Article: Why should one take seriously the imperative
that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of
human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to
live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human
beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
I.
“Notwithstanding their European origins, . . . . In Asia, Africa, and
South America, [human rights now] constitute the only language
in which the opponents and victims of murderous regimes and
civil wars can raise their voices against violence, repression, and
persecution, against injuries to their human dignity.”
—Jürgen Habermas3

Nothing in this Article depends on the claim that the morality of human rights is the
first global morality—or even on the claim that the morality of human rights is a global
morality. Even if it is not a global morality, much less the first global morality, the
morality of human rights is an important morality—sufficiently important that it is
worthwhile to do what I do in this Article: clarify and interrogate aspects of the morality
of human rights.
2. It bears emphasis that in this Article, I do not assert, imply, or presuppose a
position on any question concerning the effectiveness or even the legitimacy of any part
of the international, U.N.-sponsored human rights system, including any question
concerning the effectiveness or the legitimacy of any of the institutions that are part of
the international human rights system. My focus in this Article is on the morality of
human rights, not on the international human rights system. Skepticism about the
effectiveness or the legitimacy of one or more parts of that system is ample and various,
but I do not engage such skepticism here.
3. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND RATIONALITY: ESSAYS ON REASON, GOD,
AND MODERNITY 153 (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 2002).

776

[VOL. 50: 775, 2013]

The Morality of Human Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Lloyd Weinrib has written that “despite their ubiquity in our discourse, it
is unclear just what a right is.”4 In discourse about human rights, it is
often unclear just what a “human right” is—or, more precisely, just what
human right means. So, a clarification of what Jürgen Habermas calls
the “language” of human rights is in order: In the context in which I am
interested here—the context of the internationalization of human rights—
what does human right mean?
When we read any human rights instrument, be it international, regional,
or national, we see that the substantive provisions of the instrument—as
distinct from the procedural provisions, which concern such matters as
monitoring bodies and reporting requirements—state rules of conduct.
More precisely, the substantive provisions state rules of conduct mainly
for government, both rules that direct government not to do something to
human beings and rules that direct government to do something for human
beings. As Habermas emphasizes, the language of “human rights” has
become the principal language in which such rules are articulated and
discussed. Moreover, the language of “rights” entails the language of
“duties”: To say that A has a “right” that B not do X to A is to say that B
has a “duty” not to do X to A; to say that A has a “right” that B do Y for A
is to say that B has a “duty” to do Y for A.
In the language of rights and duties, those whose conduct a rule
governs are duty bearers with respect to the rule, and those to whom the
duty bearers are not to do something or for whom the duty bearers are to
do something are rights holders. To say that someone, A, “has” a particular
right is a way of saying that there is a particular rule of conduct according to
which A is a rights holder. And to say that someone, B, has “violated” a
particular right of A’s is to say that there is a particular rule of conduct
according to which A is a rights holder and B is a duty bearer and that B
has done to A what according to the rule, the duty bearers are not to do
to the rights holders or that B has not done for A what according to the
rule, the duty bearers are to do for the rights holders.
However, to say that there is a particular right—a particular rule of
conduct—is not to say what authority, if any, the right or rule has. In
saying that there is a particular right, one may be claiming that the right
is (1) legislated, so to speak, by God; (2) warranted by “reason”;
(3) protected in the legal system of one’s country; (4) listed in a treaty to

4. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Rights, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 278, 281 (Robert F. George ed., 1992).
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which one’s country is a party; and so on. The claim that a particular
right or rule has this or that authority—that the right or rule is warranted
by “reason”—is contestable and indeed may be false.
As the various international human rights treaties—all of which I list
in the Appendix—illustrate,






in the case of all international human rights, the duty bearers
include government actors;
in the case of most international human rights, the duty
bearers include only government actors;
in the case of some international human rights, the duty
bearers include nongovernment “private” actors as well as
government actors;
in the case of most international human rights, the rights
holders include all human beings—all born human beings;5
and
in the case of some international human rights, however,
the rights holders include not all human beings but only
some.

Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which
is the most widely ratified international human rights treaty,6 is an
example of an international human right according to which the rights
holders are not all human beings but only some: Article 37 requires
government to “ensure that: (a) . . . . Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”7 Article 38 of the
CRC is another example: Article 38 requires government to “refrain
from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years
into their armed forces.”8
As Articles 37 and 38 of the CRC reflect, that government may justifiably
do something to some human beings does not entail that government
may justifiably do the same thing to all human beings; that government

5. The UDHR states, in Article 1, that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity . . . . [A]nd should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
UDHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
6. As of December 2012, there were 193 state parties to the CRC: every member
of the United Nations except Somalia and the United States. See Convention on the
Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1990/09/19900902%200314%20AM/Ch_IV_11p.pdf.
8. Id. art. 38.
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may justifiably recruit adults into the military does not entail that it may
justifiably recruit children. Similarly, that government may justifiably decline
to do something for some human beings, for example, able-bodied persons,
does not entail that it may justifiably decline to do the same thing for human
beings who are disabled. One of the most recent international human rights
treaties to enter into force is the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, which entered into force in 2008.9
In what sense is a right according to which the rights holders are not
all human beings but only some, for example, children, truly a human right?
The UDHR states, in Article 1, that “[a]ll human beings . . . . [S]hould act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”10 As the concept human
right is understood both in the UDHR and in all the various international
human rights treaties that have followed in the UDHR’s wake, a right is
a human right, even if according to the right the rights holders are not
all but only some human beings, if the rationale for establishing and
protecting the right, for example, as a treaty-based right, is, in part, that
conduct that violates the right violates the imperative to “act towards all
human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights
articulated in the UDHR or in one or more international human rights
treaties, for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the UDHR and
elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment,”11 is a specification of what, in conjunction with other
considerations, the imperative is thought to forbid or to require, which
imperative serves as the normative ground of human rights. More about
that in the next Part. The rationale for Article 38 of the CRC is, in part,
that conduct that violates Article 38 fails to act “in a spirit of brotherhood”
toward some human beings: children.
*****
In what sense—and where—are some human rights “legal” rights?

9. As of March 2013, there were 130 state parties to the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Dec. 2006), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en.
10. See UDHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
11. Article 5 of the UDHR states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Id. art. 5.
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A particular right—including a particular human right—is a legal right
in a particular legal system, in a meaningfully practical sense of “legal,”
if and only if the right is generally enforceable in that legal system. So,
a particular right, for example, the right to freedom of religion, may be a
legal right in one legal system, for example, Canada, but not in another,
for example, Saudi Arabia.
I discuss the UDHR in the Appendix. It bears emphasis that the fact
that a right is listed in the UDHR does not mean that the right is a legal
right anywhere because that a right is listed in the UDHR does not mean
that the right is enforceable anywhere. Indeed, as Eleanor Roosevelt stated,
immediately preceding the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of
the UDHR,
“In giving our approval to the [UDHR] today, it is of primary importance that
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty;
it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a
statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General
Assembly by formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard
of achievement for all peoples of all nations.”12

As it happens, “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has served as a
model for constitution makers. Countless constitutions written since 1948
contain guarantees that either mirror or draw upon the Declaration.”13
*****
In what sense are all human rights “moral” rights?
As I just explained, not every human right—not every right internationally
recognized as a human right—is a legal right in every country. Indeed,
and sadly, although many human rights are legal rights in many countries,
no human rights are legal rights in some countries. Happily, the number
of such countries is diminishing, albeit slowly. Nonetheless, is every

12. 5 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 16, at 243
(1965) (quoting Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. Representative to the Gen. Assembly,
General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1948), in DEP’T ST.
BULL., Dec. 19, 1948, at 751, 751).
On “customary international law” and the debate among international lawyers about
whether the rights listed in the UDHR, or some of them, have achieved the status of
customary international law, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 41–46 (4th ed. 2009); RICHARD B. LILLICH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 146–61 (4th ed. 2006).
13. A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern
Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 18 (2009) (citing
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 313 (1996)).
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human right a moral right? More precisely, is every putative human
right a putative moral right?
Recall that as the concept human right is understood in the UDHR and
in every international human rights treaty, a right is a human right if the
rationale for establishing and protecting the right is, in part, that conduct
that violates the right violates the “act towards all human beings in a
spirit of brotherhood” imperative. Given that understanding of human
right and assuming that the category moral right includes whatever else
it includes,14 rights whose fundamental rationale is that conduct that
violates the right violates the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of
brotherhood” imperative or some equivalent norm, every human right is
a moral right.
Some have insisted, however, that moral rights are not really rights,
that the only genuine rights are legal rights, and that so-called moral rights
are phony, counterfeit, faux pseudo-rights. Consider, in that regard, Jeremy
Bentham’s famous dismissal of the language of “natural” rights:
[1.] Of a natural right who has any idea? I, for my part, have none: a natural
right is a round square, – an incorporeal body. What a legal right is I know.
I know how it was made. I know what it means when made. To me a right
and a legal right are the same thing . . . . Right and law are correlative terms:
as much so as son and father. Right is with me the child of law: from different
operations of the law result different sorts of rights.15
[2.] Right, the substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come real
rights; but from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by
poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary
rights, a bastard brood of monsters, ‘gorgons and chimaeras dire.’16
[3.] Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights,
rhetorical nonsense, – nonsense upon stilts.17

14. There is no consensus about the concept of morality. See, e.g., MORALITY AND
SELF-INTEREST (Paul Bloomfield ed., 2008); Joel J. Kupperman, Why Ethical Philosophy
Needs To Be Comparative, 85 PHILOSOPHY 185 (2010); Jean Porter, Christian Ethics and the
Concept of Morality: A Historical Inquiry, J. SOC’Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS, Fall/Winter 2006,
at 3.
15. Jeremy Bentham, Supply Without Burthen or Escheat Vice Taxation, in NONSENSE
UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 70, 72–73 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1987).
16. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 15, at 46, 69.
17. Id. at 53.
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According to Amartya Sen,
[Bentham’s] suspicion remains very alive today, and despite persistent use of
the idea of human rights in practical affairs, there are many who see the idea of
human rights [understood as moral rights] as no more than “bawling upon paper,”
to use another of Bentham’s barbed portrayals of natural right claims.18

The fundamental difference between legal rights and moral rights
concerns the enforceability of the rights. Legal rights are, as such,
enforceable. Social rights too—rights that, although they do not have the
status of law in a particular community, are nonetheless widely regarded
by members of the community as authoritative for the community—are,
as such, enforceable; members of the community enforce them by shaming
those who violate the rights, or by shunning them. In what way, if any, are
moral rights—moral rights as such and not as social or legal rights—
enforceable?
For one who believes that God enforces true moral rights, by punishing or
otherwise holding accountable those who violate the rights, moral rights
too are enforceable. But for one who is not a theist—or for a theist who
does not believe that God is in the business of holding accountable those
who violate true moral rights—moral rights are not, as such, enforceable.
And for some for whom moral rights are not, as such, enforceable, moral
rights are not really “rights” at all. Listen to Raymond Geuss: “[E]ssential to
the existence of a set of ‘rights’ [is] that there be some specifiable and
more or less effective mechanism for enforcing them[.]”19 Listen, too, to
Alasdair MacIntyre:
[W]henever [there is] good reason for describing transactions in [the language
of rights], it is always in virtue of the existence . . . of some particular set of
institutional arrangements requiring description in those terms, and the rights
in question therefore will always be institutionally conferred, institutionally
recognized and institutionally enforced rights . . . .20

Given what Bentham, Geuss, MacIntrye, and others have emphasized,
why not just abandon the arguably misleading language of moral rights?
What is gained, if anything, by using that language?

18. Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
315, 316 (2004).
19. RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS 143 (2001). For a
critique of Geuss’s position, see John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in
FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 75,
79–88 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007).
20. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 32 (2008) (quoting
Alasdair MacIntyre, W. Alton Jones Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt
Univ., Are There Any Natural Rights? (Feb. 28, 1983), in ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, ARE
THERE ANY NATURAL RIGHTS? 12 (1983)).
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[T]he ancients and the medievals did not have the notion of a right—was their
moral life stunted in some way as a result? Did they lack the tools for dealing
with certain aspects of the moral enterprise? Among them moral questions
were dealt with in terms of what is [morally] right or wrong, what is in
accordance with or required by the natural law, what people ought to do or are
obliged to do, but not in terms of what someone has a right to, or has a right to
do.21

Again, what if anything is gained by using the language of moral rights?
Here is John Finnis’s answer, in Natural Law and Natural Rights:
[T]he modern vocabulary and grammar of [moral] rights [are an] instrument for
reporting and asserting the requirements or other implications of a relationship
of justice from the point of view of the person(s) who benefit(s) from that
relationship. It provides a way of talking about ‘what is just’ from a special
angle: the viewpoint of the ‘other(s)’ to whom something (including, inter alia,
freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who would be wronged if denied that
something.
....
The modern language of rights provides . . . a supple and potentially precise
instrument for sorting out and expressing the demands of justice.22

James Griffin makes a similar but more focused point in On Human
Rights. He speaks not about the usefulness of moral rights talk generally
but about the usefulness of a particular kind of moral rights talk, namely,
human rights talk:
21. THEODORE M. BENDITT, RIGHTS 3 (1982). John Finnis and James Griffin
make much the same point: “[I]t is salutary to bear in mind that the modern emphasis on
the powers of the right-holder, and the consequent systematic bifurcation between ‘right’
(including ‘liberty’) and ‘duty’, is something that sophisticated lawyers were able to do
without for the whole life of classical Roman law.” JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 209 (2d ed. 2011). “Ethics . . . could do without the discourse of [human]
rights and still say all that is necessary to it.” JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 94
(2008).
22. FINNIS, supra note 21, at 205, 210 (emphasis omitted). Immediately after
emphasizing the usefulness of moral rights talk, John Finnis cautions that such talk “is
often, . . . though not inevitably or irremediably, a hindrance to clear thought when the
question is: What are the demands of justice?” Id. at 210 (emphasis omitted). For a
critique of rights talk that hinders “clear thought” about “the demands of justice,” see
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
(1991). It bears emphasis that Professor Glendon’s critique of some rights talk is not a
critique of all rights talk; for Glendon’s embrace of talk about international human
rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter GLENDON, A WORLD
MADE NEW].
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[T]he discourse [of human rights] has distinct merits. It focuses and gives
prominence to obligations that arise, not from social status or special talents or
skills, but from the dignity of human status itself. The dignity of human status
itself is not the only, or the most, important moral status that human beings
have. The case for singling it out is largely practical. Ring-fencing this particular
status gives it prominence, ease of transmission, enhanced effectiveness in our
social life, and indeed in our moral life, and so on.23

For better or worse, the language of rights—especially the language of
human rights—is now a common feature of moral discourse throughout
the world and is likely to remain so. Indeed, the language of human rights
has become the moral lingua franca. Look again at the Habermas quote
at the beginning of this Part. It is difficult to see that there is anything of
consequence to be gained by refusing to make peace with that state of
affairs.
*****
Now, with the foregoing clarification of human rights talk—of what
Habermas calls the “language” of human rights—behind us, I want to
pursue the inquiry that is my principal concern in this Article.
II.
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
—Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights24
The fundamental imperative articulated in the foundational human rights
document of our time—the UDHR—directs “all human beings” to “act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”25 In drafting Article 1 as he
did, René Cassin, the French delegate,
had wanted to stress “the fundamental principle of the unity of the human race”
because Hitler had “started by asserting the inequality of men before attacking
their liberties.” Later on, Cassin reiterated the point that “the authors of that
Article had wished to indicate the unity of the human race regardless of frontiers, as
opposed to theories like those of Hitler.” When someone in the Third Committee
23. GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 94.
24. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
25. Because, as Dianne Amann has emphasized to me, the term brotherhood has a
masculine resonance, it is useful to remember that the UDHR was drafted and adopted in
1948. Is fraternité better? The French version of Article 1, which is the language in
which Article 1 was originally drafted, states, “Tous les êtres humains naissent libres et
égaux en dignité et en droits. Ils sont doués de raison et de conscience et doivent agir les
uns envers les autres dans un esprit de fraternité.” Id.
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observed that these principles were too well known and did not need to be
stated again, Cassin quickly responded that that argument “was invalid in light of
recent events. Within the preceding years,” he said, “millions of men had
lost their lives, precisely because those principles had been ruthlessly flouted.”
He thought it “was essential that the UN should again proclaim to mankind
those principles which had come so close to extinction and should refute the
abominable doctrine of fascism.”26

The “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative
is fundamental in the sense that it serves, in the morality of human rights, as
the normative ground of human rights. Again, as the concept human
right is understood both in the UDHR and in all the various international
human rights treaties that have followed in the UDHR’s wake, a right is
a human right, even if according to the right the rights holders are not all
but only some human beings, if the rationale for establishing and protecting
the right, for example, as a treaty-based right, is, in part, that conduct
that violates the right violates the imperative to “act towards all human
beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights articulated
in the UDHR or in an international human rights treaty, for example, the
right, articulated in Article 5 of the UDHR and elsewhere, not to be
subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”27 is
a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the
imperative—the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid
or to require.
A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the
supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human
beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids or requires X—is
controversial. In this Article, however, I am not interested in defending or
criticizing particular specifications.28 I am interested instead in interrogating
the imperative itself: What reason or reasons does one have, if any, to
live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human
beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?

26. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 38–39 (1999) (citations omitted). On René Cassin, see GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 22, at 61–64.
27. Article 5 of the UDHR states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” UDHR, supra note 1, art. 5.
28. I have defended two such specifications—the right to moral equality and the
right to religious and moral freedom—elsewhere: PERRY, supra note †, ch. 6–7; Michael
J. Perry, Freedom of Conscience as Religious and Moral Freedom, 29 J.L. & RELIGION
124 (2014).
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Let us consider the principal response to that question embedded in
the three main components of the International Bill of Human Rights29:
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).
The UDHR refers, in its preamble, to “the inherent dignity . . . of
all members of the human family” and states, in Article 1, that “[a]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity . . . . [A]nd should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”30 The ICCPR and the
ICESCR each refer, in their preambles, to “the inherent dignity . . . of all
members of the human family”31 and to “the inherent dignity of the human
person”32—from which, both covenants declare, “the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family . . . derive.”33
In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution—
A/RES/41/120, titled “Setting International Standards in the Field of
Human Rights”—according to which international human rights
treaties should not designate a right as a human right unless the right is,
inter alia, “of fundamental character and derive[s] from the inherent dignity
and worth of the human person.”34 In 1993, the U.N.-sponsored World
Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, which includes this language in its preamble:
“Recognizing and affirming that all human rights derive from the dignity
and worth inherent in the human person . . . .”35
The passages quoted in the preceding two paragraphs constitute this
twofold claim: Each and every—born—human being (1) has equal inherent
dignity and (2) is therefore inviolable: not to be violated.
The Oxford English Dictionary gives this as the principal definition of
dignity: “The quality of being worthy or honourable; worthiness, worth,
nobleness, excellence.”36 That every human being has “inherent” dignity is
the International Bill’s way of saying that the dignity that every human
29. On the International Bill of Human Rights, see infra Appendix.
30. UDHR, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1.
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 172; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 4.
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31, at 173;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 31, at 5.
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31, at 172–
73; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 31, at
4–5.
34. G.A. Res. 41/120, ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/120 (Dec. 4, 1986).
35. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993).
36. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989).
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being has is, not as a member of one or another group—racial, ethnic,
national, religious, et cetera—not as a man or a woman, not as someone
who has done or achieved something, and so on, but simply as a human
being. To say that every human being has “equal” inherent dignity is to
say that no human being has more—or less—inherent dignity than another
human being: “All human beings are . . . equal in dignity . . . .”37 Hereafter,
when I say inherent dignity, I mean “equal inherent dignity.”
That every human being is inviolable—not to be violated—is to say
that one should not violate any human being; instead, one should respect
every human being, that is, “[a]ll human beings . . . . [S]hould act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”38 One violates a human being, in
the relevant sense of violate, when one fails to “act towards [the human
being] in a spirit of brotherhood.”39 One respects a human being when
one does “act towards [the human being] in a spirit of brotherhood.”40
Moreover, “act[ing] towards [all human beings] in a spirit of
brotherhood”41 requires that one does what one reasonably can, all things
considered, both to prevent certain hurtful things from being done to
human beings, whether to all human beings or just to some, for example,
children, and to require that certain helpful things be done for human
beings, whether for all human beings or just for some, for example, the
disabled. Therefore, and in particular, one should do what one reasonably
can to get certain rights—certain rules of conduct—established and
protected. If one refuses to do what one reasonably can, all things
considered, both to prevent certain hurtful things from being done to
human beings and to require that certain helpful things be done for human
beings, then one is not respecting those human beings—one is not
“act[ing] towards [them] in a spirit of brotherhood”42—but, instead, one
is violating them.
What rights should one do what one reasonably can to get established
and protected? That is, what hurtful things should one do what one
reasonably can to prevent from being done to human beings? What
helpful things should one do what one reasonably can to require be done
for human beings?
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

UDHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In the context of the UDHR and human rights treaties, both international
and regional, the fundamental concern is rights against government.43 In
that context, the answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph
is this: those hurtful things the doing of which by government, and those
helpful things the not doing of which by government, one judges to be
failures by government to act toward its citizens or others with whom it
deals “in a spirit of brotherhood.”
The large majority of the nations of the world agree about what many
of the “doings” and “not doings” by government are that constitute failures
by government to act toward its citizens or others with whom it deals “in
a spirit of brotherhood.” The large majority of nations also agree, therefore,
about what many of the rights are—rights against government—that should
be established and protected: the rights listed in the UDHR and in those
human rights treaties to which the large majority of nations are parties.
*****
The International Bill of Human Rights’ foundational twofold claim—
that every human being has inherent dignity and is therefore inviolable
—gives rise to an inquiry I now want to pursue. These three linked
passages are prologue to the inquiry:
 “The masses blink and say: ‘We are all equal. – Man is but
man, before God – we are all equal.’ Before God! But now
this God has died.” —Friedrich Nietzsche44
 “Nietzsche’s thought[:] there is, not only no God, but no
metaphysical order of any kind . . . .” —Bernard Williams45

43. Some rights against government are indirectly rights against nongovernmental
—nonstate—actors: the rights that require government to protect human beings from one
or another kind of abusive action by nongovernmental actors. See Monica Hakimi, State
Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 342 (2010).
44. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, quoted in GEORGE PARKIN
GRANT, ENGLISH-SPEAKING JUSTICE 77 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds.,
1985); cf. Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, 81 YALE REV.
1, 3–4 (1993) (“When contemporary admirers of Plato claim that all featherless bipeds –
even the stupid and childlike, even the women, even the sodomized – have the same
inalienable rights, admirers of Nietzsche reply that the very idea of inalienable human
rights . . . is a laughably feeble attempt by the weak to fend off the strong.”).
45. Bernard Williams, Republican and Galilean, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1990,
at 45, 48 (reviewing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY (1989)); cf. JOHN M. RIST, REAL ETHICS: RECONSIDERING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY 2 (2002) (“[Plato] came to believe that if morality, as more
than ‘enlightened’ self-interest, is to be rationally justifiable, it must be established on
metaphysical foundations . . . .”).

788

[VOL. 50: 775, 2013]

The Morality of Human Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

 “Few contemporary moral philosophers . . . have really joined
battle with Nietzsche about morality. By and large we have
just gone on taking moral judgements for granted as if nothing
had happened. We, the philosopher watchdogs, have mostly
failed to bark . . . .” —Philippa Foot46
The twofold dignity-inviolability claim coheres well with some theistic
worldviews. As Charles Taylor has explained, “[The] affirmation
of universal human rights” that characterizes “modern liberal political
culture” represents an “authentic development[] of the gospel.”47 But
does the claim also cohere, well or otherwise, with any secular worldview
—by which I mean, here, any nontheistic worldview: either any worldview
that denies, as Nietzsche denied, or even any worldview that is agnostic
about, the existence of a “transcendent” reality—a reality of the sort
conventionally referred to as “God”—as distinct from the reality that is
or could be the object of natural scientific inquiry?48 Bertrand Russell
wrote,
That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his
beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no

46. PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS 103 (2001).
47. Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity?, in A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 13, 16
(James L. Heft ed., 1999). Taylor hastens to add
that modern culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of Christendom,
also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever were taken or
could have been taken within Christendom. In relation to the earlier forms of
Christian culture, we have to face the humbling realization that the breakout
was a necessary condition of the development.
Id. For Taylor’s development of the point, with particular reference to modern liberal
political culture’s affirmation of universal human rights, see id. at 18–19.
Consider, in the context of the statement by Charles Taylor that accompanies this
footnote, that both Pope John XXIII and Pope John Paul II revered the UDHR. In his
encyclical, Pacem in Terris (1963), John XXIII called the UDHR “an act of the highest
importance.” See Avery Dulles, Human Rights: Papal Teaching and the United Nations,
AMERICA, Dec. 5, 1998, at 14, 15. In his first encyclical, Redemptor Hominis (1979), John
Paul II referred to the UDHR as “a magnificent effort.” Id. Sixteen years later, 1995, in
his address to the United Nations, John Paul II described the UDHR as “one of the highest
expressions of the human conscience of our time.” Id. In 1998, in his message for
World Peace Day, John Paul II emphasized that the UDHR should be “observed integrally
both in its spirit and letter.” Id.
48. On the idea of the “transcendent,” see generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR
AGE (2007); VARIETIES OF SECULARISM IN A SECULAR AGE (Michael Warner et al. eds.,
2010).
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heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life
beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to
extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of
Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe
in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain,
that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the
scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair,
can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.49

Is it the case that the dignity-inviolability claim and a Russellian worldview
are like oil and water—they do not “mix”?
A.
Let us consider each part of the twofold dignity-inviolability claim,
beginning with the first part, the dignity claim: Does the dignity claim
cohere with any secular worldview?
The claim that every human being has inherent dignity is controversial:
Not everyone believes that every human being has inherent dignity.
Moreover, even among those who do believe it, not everyone gives the
same answer to this question: Why—in virtue of what—does every human
being have inherent dignity?
A theist may give one or another theistic answer.50 For example, a
theist may say, Every human being is created in the image of God.51 Or

49. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A Free Man’s Worship, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 46, 47–
48 (1918). Russell’s position brings to mind one of Nietzsche’s sayings:
Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which—fortunately—has its day; all
on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences,
something of no importance to the general character of the earth; the earth itself,
like every star, a hiatus between two nothingnesses, an event without plan,
reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of necessity, stupid necessity—
Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity says to us: “all that
must be false, for it arouses indignation— Could all that not be merely appearance?
And man, in spite of all, as Kant says—”
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 169 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann &
R. J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1901) (emphasis omitted).
50. Among countless examples, two from the nineteenth century are, for me,
unforgettable. The first is William Gladstone:
[P]erhaps the litmus test of whether the reader is in any sense a liberal or not
is Gladstone’s foreign-policy speeches. . . .
In [one such speech], taken from the late 1870s, around the time of the
Midlothian campaign, [Gladstone] reminded his listeners that “the sanctity of
life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows, is as inviolable
in the eye of almighty God as can be your own that the law of mutual love is
not limited by the shores of this island, is not limited by the boundaries of
Christian civilization; that it passes over the whole surface of the earth, and
embraces the meanest along with the greatest in its unmeasured scope.” By all
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a theist may say, Every human being is sacred: speaking analogically,
every human being is a beloved child of God and a sister or brother to
oneself.52
means smile at the oratory. But anyone who sneers at the underlying message
is not a liberal in any sense of that word worth preserving.
Samuel Brittan, Making Common Cause? How Liberals Differ, and What They Ought To
Agree on, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 20, 1996, at 3, 4. The second, a little
earlier than Gladstone, is Herman Melville:
But this august dignity I treat of, is not the dignity of kings and robes, but that
abounding dignity which has no robed investiture. Thou shalt see it shining in
the arm that wields a pick or drives a spike; that democratic dignity which, on
all hands, radiates without end from God; Himself! The great God absolute!
The centre and circumference of all democracy! His omnipresence, our divine
equality!
HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 166 (Random House, Inc. 1992) (1851).
51. POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO NONCHRISTIAN RELIGIONS (N.C.W.C. trans., 1965) (“We cannot truly call on God, the Father
of all, if we refuse to treat in a brotherly way any man, created as he is in the image of
God. Man’s relation to God the Father and his relation to men his brothers are so linked
together that Scripture says: ‘He who does not love does not know God’ (1 John 4:8).”).
52. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION,
LAW, COURTS 7–13 (2007) [hereinafter PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS]. For a slightly revised
version, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 29–
44 (2010) [hereinafter PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY]; see also CHARLES E. CURRAN,
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, 1891–PRESENT: A HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ETHICAL
ANALYSIS 132 (2002) (“Human dignity comes from God’s free gift; it does not depend on
human effort, work, or accomplishments. All human beings have a fundamental, equal
dignity because all share the generous gift of creation and redemption from God. . . .
Consequently, all human beings have the same fundamental dignity, whether they are
brown, black, red, or white; rich or poor; young or old; male or female; healthy or
sick.”). As philosopher Hilary Putnam has noted, the moral image central to what
Putnam calls the Jerusalem-based religions “stresse[s] equality and also fraternity, as in
the metaphor of the whole human race as One Family, of all women and men as sisters
and brothers.” HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 60–61 (1987). In their
introduction The Spirituality of the Talmud, Ben Zion Bokser and Baruch M. Bokser
state, “From this conception of man’s place in the universe comes the sense of the
supreme sanctity of all human life. ‘He who destroys one person has dealt a blow at the
entire universe, and he who saves or sustains one person has sustained the whole
world.’” Ben Zion Bokser & Baruch M. Bokser, Introduction to THE TALMUD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 30 (Ben Zion Bokser trans., 1989) (footnote omitted). They continue:
The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin, religious affiliation,
or social status. In the sight of God, the humble citizen is the equal of the
person who occupies the highest office. As one talmudist put it: “Heaven and
earth I call to witness, whether it be an Israelite or pagan, man or woman, slave
or maidservant, according to the work of every human being doth the Holy
Spirit rest upon him.” . . . As the rabbis put it: “We are obligated to feed nonJews residing among us even as we feed Jews; we are obligated to visit their
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A nontheist, by contrast, may give one or another secular answer, such
as, Every human being, or virtually every human being, has, or at a later
stage of life will have, the wondrous human capacities to love, to reason, to
imagine, and the like. Listen, for example, to philosopher James Griffin:
Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have
a conception of ourselves and of our past and future. We reflect and assess.
We form pictures of what a good life would be—often, it is true, only on a
small scale, but occasionally also on a large scale. And we try to realize these
pictures. This is what we mean by a distinctively human existence—distinctive so
far as we know. . . .
Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or . . .
our personhood.53

Of course, any theistic answer to “Why does every human being have
inherent dignity?” will be controversial, not only as between theists and
nontheists but also as among theists because not all theists affirm the same
theism. But every secular philosophical answer with which I am familiar—
not least, James Griffin’s answer—is controversial too, not only as between
theists and nontheists but also as among nontheists.
Moreover, it is open to serious question whether any secular
philosophical answer can warrant the claim that all human beings—
even infants and the severely mentally disabled—have inherent dignity.54
And, indeed, according to Griffin, neither infants nor the severely
mentally disabled have human rights—neither infants nor the severely

sick even as we visit the Jewish sick; we are obligated to attend to the burial of
their dead, even as we attend to the burial of Jewish dead.”
Id. at 30–31.
53. GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 32, 33.
54. See generally RAIMOND GAITA, A COMMON HUMANITY: THINKING ABOUT
LOVE AND TRUTH AND JUSTICE (2000) (suggesting that each individual is unconditionally
precious); PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 52, at 45–57 (arguing against the
secular argument that all humans have inherent dignity); PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 52, at 14–29 (noting that “the heart of the morality of human rights has two parts,
the first of which is that every human being has inherent dignity”); WOLTERSTORFF,
supra note 20 (defending the importance of justice as inherent rights and the importance
of rights as normative bonds foundational to human community); Michael J. Perry,
Morality and Normativity, 13 LEGAL THEORY 211, 215–16, 221 (2007) (suggesting that
no secular arguments sufficiently answer the ground-of-normativity question); Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Can Human Rights Survive Secularization?, 54 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2009)
(examining whether the recognition of human rights can survive the loss of belief in
God); John Dobard, The Inheritance of Excellence: On the Uses, Justification and
Problem of Human Dignity (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1580548 (“[C]ertain human beings, namely, infants, elderly persons
with dementia, and the profoundly mentally disabled, have been excluded from dignity’s
scope.”). But cf. ARI KOHEN, IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A NON-RELIGIOUS GROUNDING
IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 8–37 (2007) (analyzing secular and nonsecular conceptions of
human rights).
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mentally disabled are holders of human rights—because infants and the
severely mentally disabled do not have a conception of themselves and
of their past and future; they do not reflect and assess; they do not form
pictures of what a good life would be.55
B.
The first claim—the dignity claim—is about the status of every—
born—human being: Every human being has inherent dignity. The second
claim—the inviolability claim—is about the normative force that that
status—the inherent dignity that every human being has—has for us:
Every human being is therefore inviolable: not to be violated. According to
the inviolability claim, because every human being has inherent dignity, one
should not violate any human being; instead, one should respect every
human being. In the words of the UDHR, “all human beings . . . . [S]hould
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”56
Does the inviolability claim cohere with any secular worldview?
The inviolability claim, like the dignity claim, is controversial. Just as
not everyone believes that every human being has inherent dignity, not
everyone believes that every human being is inviolable, and indeed, it
may be the case that one does not believe that every human being is
inviolable because one does not believe that every human being has
inherent dignity. But even if one assumes for the sake of discussion that
every human being has inherent dignity, why should one think—why
should one conclude—that one should not violate any human being? We
can imagine someone saying—and indeed we do not have to try very
hard to imagine someone saying—Okay, I will assume that every human
being has inherent dignity. So what? What is that to me? Why should
I care? It is not enough to say, in response, Because every human being
has inherent dignity. It is not obvious, even if one assumes that every
human being has inherent dignity, why one should conclude that one
should not violate any human being. One or more premises are missing.
The—assumed—truth of the dignity claim does not entail the truth of the
inviolability claim.

55. For critical commentary on this aspect of Griffin’s position, see Rowan Cruft,
Two Approaches to Human Rights, 60 PHIL. Q. 176, 178–79 (2010). See generally Mark
Platts, The Languages of Rights and of Human Rights, 85 PHILOSOPHY 319 (2010)
(discussing the same).
56. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
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A theist may give one or another theistic answer. An adherent of one
of the Jerusalem-based religions, which is how philosopher Hilary Putnam
has referred to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,57 may say something to
this effect: The perfection for which God created us, the true happiness
—eudemonia—that is our ultimate end, consists, in part, in discerning—
in our hearts, so to speak, if not also in our minds—the Other—every
“other,” every human being—as sacred—as a beloved child of God and
a sister or brother to oneself—and in loving the Other. To love the
Other—love not in the sense of eros or philia but of agape—is never to
violate but always to respect the Other.58 Such an answer presupposes
what is surely true: we human beings—most of us, at least—are committed
to achieving our true happiness, even though we may and usually do
disagree with one another—sometimes radically so—about what our
true happiness consists in.
The question, again, is why, even assuming that every human being
has inherent dignity, one should accept the “therefore”—why it follows
from every human being’s having inherent dignity that one should not
violate any human being but instead should respect every human being.
Even if one rejects any theistic answer as implausible, as of course anyone
will who rejects any and all theistic worldviews as implausible, it is not
clear that there is any satisfactory secular answer to the question—any
satisfactory secular equivalent of or alternative to a theistic answer. That
a proposition coheres with—that it mixes with, that it “makes sense” in the
context of—a theistic worldview does not entail that the proposition also
coheres with any secular worldview. The inviolability claim—according to
which one should live one’s life so as not to violate any human being but
to respect every human being—coheres with some theistic worldviews.
It is open to serious question, however, whether the claim coheres with
any secular worldview. As Charles Taylor has put the point,
The logic of the subtraction story is something like this: Once we slough off our
concern with serving God, or attending to any other transcendent reality, what
we’re left with is human good, and that is what modern societies are concerned
with. But this radically under-describes what I’m calling modern humanism.
That I am left with only human concerns doesn’t tell me to take universal
human welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that freedom is important, or
fulfillment, or equality. Just being confined to human goods could just as
57. See PUTNAM, supra note 52, at 60–61.
58. For an elaboration of such an answer, see PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
52, at 7–13. For a slightly revised version, see PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note
52, at 29–44.
The literature on agape by Christian ethicists is voluminous. Two books by my Emory
colleague are especially worthy of mention: TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, LOVE DISCONSOLED:
MEDITATIONS ON CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1999); TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE PRIORITY OF
LOVE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003).

794

The Morality of Human Rights

[VOL. 50: 775, 2013]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

well find expression in my concerning myself exclusively with my own
material welfare, or that of my family or immediate milieu. The, in fact, very
exigent demands of universal justice and benevolence which characterize
modern humanism can’t be explained just by the subtraction of earlier goals
and allegiances.59

*****
That the International Bill of Human Rights is silent—that it is agnostic,
so to speak—both about why every human being has inherent dignity
and also about why every human being is therefore inviolable—inviolable
because every human being has inherent dignity—is not surprising given
the plurality of theistic and nontheistic worldviews that existed among
those who bequeathed us the International Bill. Catholic philosopher
Jacques Maritain reported,
[A]t one of the meetings of a UNESCO National Commission where human
rights were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain
champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights.
‘Yes,’ they said, ‘we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks
us why.’ That ‘why’ is where the argument begins.60

However, there was agreement among those who drafted the UDHR not
just about “the rights” but also about the fundamental justification of—
the fundamental warrant for—the rights, namely, that every human being
has inherent dignity and one therefore should not violate any human
being.61 Again, the UDHR explicitly refers to “the inherent dignity . . .
of all members of the human family” and states that “[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights . . . . [A]nd should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”62 So the comment quoted by
Maritain should have been stated thus, “Yes, we agree not only about the
rights but also about the fundamental warrant for the rights. But our

59. Charles Taylor, Closed World Structures, in RELIGION AFTER METAPHYSICS
47, 61 (Mark A. Wrathall ed., 2003).
60. Jacques Maritain, Introduction to H UMAN R IGHTS : C OMMENTS AND
I NTERPRETATIONS 9 (UNESCO ed., 1949); see also GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW,
supra note 22, at 73–78 (reviewing responses to UNESCO philosophers’ committee
request for reflections on human rights).
61. Cf. Serena Parekh, Resisting “Dull and Torpid” Assent: Returning to the Debate
over the Foundations of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 754, 763 (2007) (“Ultimately
the assumption of the natural dignity of human beings became part of the UDHR despite
the attempts by the drafters to keep the language neutral on this topic.”).
62. UDHR, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1.
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agreement is no deeper than that: We do not agree about why every
human being has inherent dignity or about why every human being is
therefore inviolable.”
*****
The normative claim that “all human beings . . . should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood” is in need of a supporting
argument, an argument in response to the inevitable question: Why should
all human beings act that way? As Yale law professor Art Leff put it
almost thirty-five years ago, “Sez who?”63 It is far from clear that there is
any adequate secular philosophical answer—Leff argued that there is no
such answer—to the question.
Let us put that question aside and consider instead this different question,
which seeks not an argument but an explanation: Why do you—you who
live your life, or at least, aspire to live your life, so as not to violate any
human being but instead to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of
brotherhood”—do so? Let us assume that the person to whom the question
is addressed—“our interlocutor”—is not a theist. 64 What might our
interlocutor say in response to that question?
Imagine our interlocutor answering along these lines: I detest and
oppose states of affairs in which human beings—any human beings, not just
ourselves and those for whom we happen to have special affection, such
as family, friends, and fellow countrymen—suffer grievously in
consequence of a law or other policy that is misguided or worse. I detest
and oppose such states of affairs because I detest and oppose such suffering.
And so I work to build a world in which such suffering is, over time,
diminished.

63. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229,
1249 (1979).
64. That one is not a theist does not necessarily mean that one is not “religious” or
“spiritual.” See Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 4, 2013, at
67, 67. Dworkin cites footnote eleven of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961), which reads, “Among religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”
As the Court noted in Torcaso, Buddhists are not, in the main, theists. Cf. Sallie B.
King, Buddhism and Human Rights, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 116 (John
Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012) (discussing Buddhist views on human
rights); Laura Kittel, Healing Heart and Mind: The Pursuit of Human Rights in Engaged
Buddhism as Exemplified by Aung San Suu Kyi and the Dalai Lama, 15 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 905, 921 (2011) (examining the connection between Buddhist human rights
advocates and spiritual practice).
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Is the sensibility that animates our interlocutor’s answer a sufficiently
sturdy basis for keeping human rights “afloat,” as poet and Nobel Laureate
Czeslaw Milosz put it, “if the [religious] bottom is taken out”?
What has been surprising in the post-Cold War period are those beautiful
and deeply moving words pronounced with veneration in places like Prague
and Warsaw, words which pertain to the old repertory of the rights of man and
the dignity of the person.
I wonder at this phenomenon because maybe underneath there is an abyss.
After all, those ideas have had their foundation in religion, and I am not overoptimistic as to the survival of religion in a scientific-technological civilization.
Notions that seemed buried forever have suddenly been resurrected. But how
long can they stay afloat if the bottom is taken out?65

Whatever the answer to the question that precedes the Milosz quote, is
there anything in our historical experience that suggests that the sensibility
in question—which may be wedded to religious faith66 but certainly need

65. Czeslaw Milosz et al., The Religious Imagination at 2000, NEW PERSP. Q.,
Fall 1997, at 32, 32 (emphasis omitted). Consider, in connection with Milosz’s worry,
this statement by Jürgen Habermas, who is not a religious believer: “Among the modern
societies, only those that are able to introduce into the secular domain the essential
contents of their religious traditions which point beyond the merely human realm will
also be able to rescue the substance of the human.” Michael Reder & Josef Schmidt,
Habermas and Religion, in AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING: FAITH AND REASON IN
A POST-SECULAR AGE 1, 5 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2010) (quoting JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
POLITIK, KUNST, RELIGION: ESSAYS ÜBER ZEITGENÖSSISCHE PHILOSOPHEN 142 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS 150–51
(Ciaran Cronin & Max Pensky eds. & trans., 2006) (“Christianity has functioned for the
normative self-understanding of modernity as more than a mere precursor or a catalyst.
Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and social solidarity, of
an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality of conscience,
human rights, and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice and the
Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of
continual critical appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no alternative to
it. And in light of the current challenges of a postnational constellation, we continue to
draw on the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.”).
66. Cf. Jack Mahoney, Evolution, Altruism, and the Image of God, 71 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 677, 701 (2010) (“[W]herever and whenever it is to be found, human altruism or
generosity, the breakout from any evolutionary self-obsession, can be seen as a reflection
of, and participation in, the creative altruism and agape of God himself.”).

797

not be67—is a less sturdy basis than theism has been for keeping human
rights afloat?68
Nonetheless, one might say, the problem of justification persists: the
justification of the sensibility. Listen, for example, to Leszek Kolakowski:
When Pierre Bayle argued that morality does not depend on religion, he was
speaking mainly of psychological independence; he pointed out that atheists
are capable of achieving the highest moral standards . . . and of putting to
shame most of the faithful Christians. That is obviously true as far as it goes,
but this matter-of-fact argument leaves the question of validity intact . . . .69

Listen, too, to John Rist: “Although a ‘moral saint’ may exist without
realist (and therefore religious) beliefs, yet his stance as moral saint cannot
be justified without recourse to realism.”70
To what Kolakowski calls “the question of validity,”71 imagine our
interlocutor responding, Again, I detest and oppose states of affairs in
which any human beings suffer grievously in consequence of a law or
other policy that is misguided or worse. You ask what justifies my
sensibility—what justifies my way of being oriented in the world; in
particular, my way of being oriented to the Other—if indeed anything
justifies it. Are you asking for an argument in support of the claim—
which for me is a conviction—that there is no more fitting way, no more
truly, deeply satisfying way, for a human being to be oriented in the
world? But I have nothing to offer you other than my experience, both
my experience—from the “inside,” as it were—of the sensibility72 and
67. See KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A
COMMON HUMANITY 121–22 (1996).
68. See Omer Bartov & Phyllis Mack, Introduction to IN GOD’S NAME: GENOCIDE
AND RELIGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 1 (Omer Bartov & Phyllis Mack eds.,
2001) (“[R]eligion has played an important role in several outbreaks of genocide since
World War I.”); see also id. (“Violence and religion have been closely associated in a
variety of intricate, often contradictory ways, since the earliest periods of human
civilization. Institutionalized religions have practiced violence against both their adherents
and their real or imagined opponents. Conversely, religions have also been known to
limit social and political violence and to provide spiritual and material comfort to its victims.
Religious faith can thus generate contradictory attitudes, either motivating aggression or
constraining it. Individual perpetrators and victims of violence can seek in religious
institutions and personal faith both a rationale for atrocity, a justification to resist violence, or
a means to come to terms with the legacy of destruction by integrating it into a
wider historical or theological context.”).
69. LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, RELIGION: IF THERE IS NO GOD . . . ON GOD, THE DEVIL, SIN
AND OTHER WORRIES OF THE SO-CALLED PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 191–92 (1982).
70. RIST, supra note 45, at 267 (emphasis omitted); cf. id. at 2 (“[Plato] came to
believe that if morality, as more than ‘enlightened’ self-interest, is to be rationally
justifiable, it must be established on metaphysical foundations . . . .”).
71. KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 69, at 191.
72. The deliverances of evolutionary biology are relevant here. See Frans de Waal,
Morally Evolved: Primate Social Instincts, Human Morality, and the Rise and Fall of
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my experience—from the “outside”—of others, such as the Dalai Lama
and Thich Nhat Hanh, who embody the sensibility, my experience of
their deep, transformative humanity and peace?73 There is much to be
done, and life is short. So I work to build a world in which such suffering
is, over time, diminished. And I work to build that world with anyone who
will work with me, whatever their particular beliefs or motivation.
Our interlocutor’s sensibility is, as the response indicates, an aspect of
a particular way of being oriented in the world; more precisely, the
sensibility is a particular way of being oriented to the Other. Let us call
the sensibility “agapic.” The kind of love called agape discloses to us “the
full humanity of others. To become properly aware of that full humanity
is to become incapable of treating it with contempt, cruelty or indifference.
The full awareness of others’ humanity that [agape] involves is an
essentially motivating perception.”74 Listen, in that regard, to something
Graham Greene wrote in The Power and the Glory: “When you visualized
“Veneer Theory,” in PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS: HOW MORALITY EVOLVED 1, 15
(Stephen Macedo & Josiah Ober eds., 2006) (“The evolutionary origin of this inclination
is no mystery. All species that rely on cooperation—from elephants to wolves and
people—show group loyalty and helping tendencies. These tendencies evolved in the
context of a close-knit social life in which they benefited relatives and companions able
to repay the favor. The impulse to help was therefore never totally without survival
value to the ones showing the impulse. But, as so often, the impulse became divorced
from the consequences that shaped its evolution. This permitted its expression even
when payoffs were unlikely, such as when strangers were beneficiaries. This brings
animal altruism much closer to that of humans than usually thought, and explains the call
for the temporary removal of ethics from the hands of philosophers.”); see also FRANS DE
WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY 4–5 (2009) (discussing the interaction between biology
and human nature); FRANS DE WAAL, THE BONOBO AND THE ATHEIST: IN SEARCH OF
HUMANISM AMONG THE PRIMATES 4–7 (2013) [hereinafter DE WAAL, THE BONOBO AND
THE ATHEIST] (examining altruism and morality in primates); Frans B.M. de Waal, Putting the
Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279,
284 (2008) (discussing concern for others observed in mammals); Frans de Waal, Morals
Without God?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/10/17/morals-without-god?/_r=0 (arguing that religion “is an add-on rather
than the wellspring of morality,” using primates as an example).
On what experimental psychology has, and has not, revealed about the possibility of
altruism, see generally Stephen Stich, John M. Doris, & Erica Roedder, Altruism, in THE
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY HANDBOOK 147 (2010).
73. See, e.g., THICH NHAT HANH, THICH NHAT HANH: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS (Robert
Ellsberg ed., 2001).
74. Timothy Chappell, Book Review, 111 MIND 411, 412 (2002) (reviewing RAIMOND
GAITA, A COMMON HUMANITY: THINKING ABOUT LOVE AND TRUTH AND JUSTICE (2000))
(emphasis added). In the quoted passage, Chappell is describing “Gaita’s view” and says
that it is “reminiscent of course of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch.” Id.
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a man or woman carefully, you could always begin to feel pity . . . . When
you saw the lines at the corners of the eyes, the shape of the mouth, how
the hair grew, it was impossible to hate. Hate was just a failure of
imagination.”75 Listen, too, to the poet Denise Levertov: “Man’s capacity
for evil . . . is less a positive capacity . . . than a failure to develop man’s
most [fundamental] human function, the imagination, to its fullness, and
consequently a failure to develop compassion.”76
Compare, to the agapic orientation to the Other, Doktor Pannwitz’s
orientation—Pannwitz, the German chemist before whom Primo Levi
stood at Auschwitz: “To Doktor Pannwitz, the prisoner standing there,
before the desk of his examiner, is not a frightened and miserable man.
He is not a dangerous or inferior or loathsome man either, condemned to
prison, torture, punishment, or death. He is, quite simply, not a man at
all.”77
Our interlocutor does not understand her agapic sensibility to be
rooted in—to be the yield of—either theistic or secular philosophical
argument. This is not to deny that unlike our interlocutor, some with such a
sensibility may “rationalize” the sensibility with theistic or secular
philosophical argument.78 Indeed, for all we know, our interlocutor—
who, recall, is not a theist—is deeply skeptical about the capacity of the
secular philosophical argument to “justify” her agapic sensibility.79 In
any event, our interlocutor’s fundamental warrant for her agapic sensibility
is neither theistic nor secular philosophical argument but instead, as her

75. GRAHAM GREENE, THE POWER AND THE GLORY 131 (Penguin Books 2003)
(1940).
76. DENISE LEVERTOV, THE POET IN THE WORLD 53 (6th prtg. 1973).
77. See ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 2 (Judith Friedlander trans., 2000).
78. Cf. DE WAAL, THE BONOBO AND THE ATHEIST, supra note 72, at 219–20, 239
(arguing that morality came before gods). For an example of a theistic “rationalization”
of the agapic sensibility, see supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
79. Cf. RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY, at x–xi (2001) (calling morality
“precious and consequential” but a myth); Richard Joyce, Morality, Schmorality, in
MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 14, at 51 (analyzing the relationship between
morality and self-interest from the perspective of a moral error theorist); Brian Leiter,
The Boundaries of the Moral (and Legal) Community, 64 ALA. L. REV. 511, 511 (2013)
(noting that those in Western society “have largely abandoned the ideas that gender, race,
ethnicity, religion, class, and now even sexual orientation are morally relevant attributes in
the sense that they are attributes that determine the basic moral consideration to which
one is entitled”); Jesse J. Prinz, Constructive Sentimentalism: Legal and Political
Implications, in PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS 3 (James E. Fleming ed., 2013) (analyzing
empirical evidence linking emotions to moral judgment); Brian Leiter, Nietzsche Against
the Philosophical Canon 1–8 (Apr. 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2254398 (discussing Nietzsche’s objections to Socrates).
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response to “the question of validity” indicates, her experience, both
from the “inside” and from the “outside.”
Because many theists are in the grip of the agapic sensibility, it bears
emphasis that, as the case of our interlocutor illustrates, one need not be
a theist to be in its grip. Many of the rescuers interviewed by Kristen
Renwick Monroe—many of the European non-Jews who during the
Holocaust, at great risk to themselves and their families, rescued Jews—
did not self-identify as theists or did not offer any theistic explanation of,
much less warrant for, their agapic sensibility.80 Moreover, there are many
who fit this profile: was a theist in the grip of the agapic sensibility, no
longer a theist but still in the grip—no less in the grip—of the agapic
sensibility.
*****
This is the question with which I began: Why should one live one’s
life—what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life—in
accord with what Article 1 of the UDHR states that “all human beings”
should do, namely, “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This is the different question to which I later turned, which, as I said,
invites not argument but explanation: Why do you live your life—or, at
least, aspire to live your life—so as not to violate any human being but
instead to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
The agapic sensibility—the agapic orientation to the Other—provides,
I am increasingly inclined to think, the deepest nontheistic explanation
for why one aspires to live life so as to “act towards all human beings in
a spirit of brotherhood.” And perhaps, even for many theists, the
deepest explanation is this: To repeat, many who once were theists but
are no longer remain well and comfortably within the grip of the agapic
sensibility.81

80. See KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR AND GENOCIDE:
IDENTITY AND MORAL CHOICE 3 (2012); Kristen Renwick Monroe, Explicating Altruism,
in ALTRUISM & ALTRUISTIC LOVE: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, & RELIGION IN DIALOGUE 106,
109 (Stephen G. Post et al. eds., 2002). See generally KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE
HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON HUMANITY (1996) (describing Otto
Springer, a German man who saved over one hundred Jewish people during the Holocaust as
“not religious” but “some combination of agnostic, Kantian, and pantheist”).
81. That one is no longer a theist does not necessarily mean that one is no longer
“religious” or “spiritual.” See Dworkin, supra note 64.
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Again, agape is a kind of love—different, to be sure, from eros and
philia but a kind of love nonetheless.82 Is it surprising that in trying to
discern—to excavate—the deepest nontheistic ground of human rights,
and perhaps the deepest ground of any sort, we have reached an orientation
to the Other—a sensibility—so fittingly expressed in the language of love?
That language provides strong support—stronger support, perhaps, than
any other language—for the morality of human rights. Indeed, perhaps the
language of love provides indispensable support for the morality of human
rights, as Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita, who is a nontheist, seems
to suggest:
[T]he language of love which compels us to affirm that even those who suffer
affliction so severe that they have irrecoverably lost everything that gives
sense to our lives, and the most radical evil-doers, are fully our fellow human
beings. On credit, so [to] speak, from this language of love, we have built a more
tractable structure of rights and obligations. If the language of love goes dead
on us, however, if there are no examples to nourish it, either because they do
not exist or because they are no longer visible to us, then talk of inalienable
natural rights or of the unconditional respect owed to rational beings will seem
lame and improbable to us. Indeed, exactly that is happening.83

APPENDIX
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The name of my state of origin—Kentucky—has been said to derive
from a Native American word meaning “a dark and bloody ground.” An
apt name for our century of origin is a dark and bloody time—indeed,
the dark and bloody time: The twentieth century “‘was the bloodiest century
in human existence,’ . . . not only because of the number of deaths attributed

82. To love another—love in the sense of agape—is not necessarily to feel a
certain way, but it is necessarily to act a certain way. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Law Like
Love, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 21 (2004) (“There are, of course, many fascinating
questions that could be raised about the love commandment. Does it command love as
an emotion or simply that we act in a certain way? Kant, convinced that we can be
morally bound only to that which is in our control . . . called emotional love pathological
love and claimed that it could not be our duty to feel it. What is actually commanded he
called practical love—which is simply acting morally as Kant conceived acting
morally.”). Murphy explained to me in discussion that by pathological, which is the
English word commonly used to translate the German word Kant used, Kant did not
mean diseased or sick but simply something from our passions with respect to which we
are passive and thus not in voluntary control.
83. GAITA, supra note 54, at xviii–xix.
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to wars—109 million—but because of the fraction of the population killed
by conflicts, more than 10 times as great as during the 16th century.”84
The list of twentieth-century horrors includes much more than wars,
however. As the century began, King Leopold II of Belgium was presiding
over a holocaust in the Congo; it is estimated that between 1880 and
1920, because of a system of slave labor, the population of the Congo
“dropped by approximately ten million people.”85 From 1915 to 1923,
the Ottoman Turks, who were Muslim, committed genocide against the
Armenian minority, who were Christian.86 Not counting deaths inflicted
in battle, the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin was responsible for the deaths
of over 42 million people, 1929–1953; China’s Mao Zedong, over 37
million, 1923–1976; and Germany’s Adolf Hitler, over 20 million,
1933–1945, including over 10 million Slavs and about 5.5 million Jews.87

84. Kim A. McDonald, Anthropologists Debate Whether, and How, War Can Be
Wiped Out, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 3, 1999, at A21 (quoting Carolyn R. Nordstrom,
professor of anthropology at the University of Notre Dame).
85. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR,
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 233 (1998). The causes—all of them related to the
system of slave labor—were several: murder, starvation, exhaustion, exposure, disease,
and a plummeting birth rate. See id. at 225–34. As Hochschild observes, this was “a
death toll of Holocaust dimensions.” Id. at 4. The holocaust in the Congo was not an
isolated event. See, e.g., Ross A. Slotten, AIDS in Namibia, 41 SOC. SCI. & MED. 277,
277 (1995) (“In 1884, Namibia formally became a German colony and was known as
German South West Africa. During the time of annexation, the Herero and Nama
peoples were the largest tribes, inhabiting the most desirable land, which the Germans
gradually expropriated between 1893 and 1903. This expropriation led to many battles,
culminating in the intentional genocide of 60% of the population. To this day, the
Hereros and Namas have not recovered their original numerical strength.” (footnotes
omitted)); Giles Foden, Rehearsal for Genocide: A Novel About German Brutality in
Colonial Africa, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Apr. 20, 2003, at 15, 15 (book review).
86. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE 61–105 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1999); see
also PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND AMERICA’S
RESPONSE 243 (2003) (illustrating the violence against Armenian Christians).
87. See R. J. Rummel, Power Kills, Absolute Power Kills Absolutely, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE, supra note 86, at 23, 29 tbl.5 [hereinafter Rummel, Power
Kills]; R. J. Rummel, The Nazi Genocide State, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE 437,
439 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1999) (“[The Nazi] genocides likely cost the lives of about
16,300,000 people: nearly 5,300,000 Jews, 260,000 Gypsies, 10,500,000 Slavs, and 220,000
homosexuals as well as another 10,000 handicapped Germans.”); see also Ian Kershaw,
Afterthought: Some Reflections on Genocide, Religion, and Modernity, in IN GOD’S
NAME: GENOCIDE AND RELIGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 372, 377 (Omer Bartov &
Phyllis Mack eds., 2001) (“The Nazi genocide against the Jews—the Holocaust, as it has
generally come to be known as—is estimated to have resulted in the murder of about five
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One need only mention these places to recall some more recent atrocities:
Cambodia, 1975–1979, Bosnia, 1992–1995, Rwanda, 1994, and in the early
years of the twenty-first century, the Darfur region of Sudan.88
Sadly, there is so much more.89 For an exhaustive and exhausting
account of the grim—indeed, horrific—details, one can consult the twovolume Encyclopedia of Genocide, which reports,
In total, during the first eighty-eight years of [the twentieth] century, almost
170 million men, women, and children were shot, beaten, tortured, knifed,
burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; buried alive, drowned,
hanged, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways governments have
inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens and foreigners. Depending on
whether one uses high or more conservative estimates, the dead could
conceivably be nearly 360 million people. It is as though our species has been
devastated by a modern Black Plague.90

and a half million Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, around half the number targeted in the
notorious Wannsee Conference of January 1942.”).
In Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, historian Timothy Snyder writes,
“Today there is widespread agreement that the mass killing of the twentieth century is of
the greatest moral significance for the twenty-first. How striking, then, that there is no
history of the bloodlands.” TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER
AND STALIN, at xix (2010). Thanks to Snyder’s extensive, searing account, we now have
that history. For an informative review of Snyder’s book, see generally Anne Applebaum,
The Worst of the Madness, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 11, 2010, at 8 (book review).
88. For a narrative of the failures of the United States to respond to genocides, see
generally SAMANTHA P OWER , “A P ROBLEM FROM H ELL”: A MERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002).
89. See, e.g., IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF
WORLD WAR II (1997); MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE: A PARABLE OF
THE COLD WAR (1994); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA, at viii (2002) (“Through 1944, when lynchings first began to
decline strongly, [the Tuskegee Institute] recorded 3,417 lynchings of blacks . . . . Not
until 1952 did a year pass without a single recorded lynching.”). See generally JONATHAN
GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1999) (“The
twentieth-century history of large-scale cruelty and killing is only too familiar: the
mutual slaughter of the First World War, the terror-famine of the Ukraine, the Gulag,
Auschwitz, Dresden, the Burma Railway, Hiroshima, Vietnam, the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, Cambodia, Rwanda, the collapse of Yugoslavia.”).
90. Rummel, Power Kills, supra note 87, at 28. On genocide in particular, see
Roger W. Smith, American Self-Interest and the Response to Genocide, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., July 30, 2004, at B6 (“[G]enocide—intentional acts to eliminate in whole, or in
substantial part, a specific human population—had claimed the lives of some 60 million
people in the 20th century, 16 million of them since 1945, when the watchword was
‘Never again.’ Genocide has, in fact, been so frequent, the number of victims so
extensive, and serious attempts to prevent it so few, that many scholars have described
the 20th century as ‘the age of genocide.’”). See generally DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY
(2009) (discussing modern mass murders and “eliminationist projects”).
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The twentieth century was not only a dark and bloody time, however.
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, a growing number of
countries around the world responded to the savage horrors of the twentieth
century by recognizing certain rights as human rights and enshrining
them in constitutions or treaties, thereby rendering the moral landscape
of the twentieth century a touch less bleak.91
The first major event in the internationalization of human rights took
place on June 26, 1945, shortly before the end of the Second World
War92: the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, which entered
into force four months later, on October 24. These are the salient U.N.
Charter provisions for present purposes:
 “We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined . . . to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small . . . .”93
 “The Purposes of the United Nations are . . . [t]o achieve
international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion . . . .”94
 “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of . . . assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”95
 “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations . . . , the United Nations shall promote
. . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights

91. For a brief account of the “historical antecedents” of international human
rights, see BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 1–28.
92. Although the European phase of the Second World War ended in May 1945,
the Pacific phase continued into the summer. In August 1945, the United States
inaugurated nuclear warfare by dropping two atomic bombs on Japan: the first—“Little
Boy”—on Hiroshima, on August 6, the second—“Fat Man”—on Nagasaki, on August 9.
93. U.N. Charter pmbl.
94. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
95. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
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and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.”96
 “All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the [United Nations] for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”97
 “[The Economic and Social Council] may make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all.”98
 “The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions . . .
for the promotion of human rights . . . .”99
Although some of the foregoing provisions refer to “fundamental freedoms”
as well as to “human rights,” a fundamental freedom, within the meaning of
the U.N. Charter, is one kind of human right: the right to the freedom to
engage in a specified activity, such as the practice of one’s religion or
the criticism of one’s government.
The U.N. Charter does not specify the human rights to which it refers.
Moreover, in 1945 there was no internationally approved list of human
rights to which the drafters of the charter were referring. Therefore, the
charter obviously needed to be—and soon was—complemented by another
document.
The second major event in the internationalization of human rights
took place on December 10, 1948: the adoption, by the General Assembly
of the United Nations, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).100 The vote was forty-eight for, zero against, and eight
abstentions.
The abstainers were all the Soviet bloc states—Byelorussia,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and the USSR, as well as Yugoslavia,
South Africa, and Saudi Arabia. “Two countries, Honduras and Yemen,
were absent.”101

96. Id. art. 55.
97. Id. art. 56.
98. Id. art. 62, para. 2.
99. Id. art. 68.
100. For insightful, historically informed commentary on several provisions of the
UDHR and on the relationship among the provisions, see GLENDON, A WORLD MADE
NEW, supra note 22, at 173–92; see also MORSINK, supra note 26, at ix–xiv (heralding
the success of the UDHR in the decades after its drafting).
For an overview of recent work on the history of human rights and criticism of some of
the most prominent instances of such work, see generally Philip Alston, Does the Past
Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2043 (2013) (book
review).
101. GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 22, at 170.
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The abstentions by South Africa and Saudi Arabia from the final vote
approving the Declaration had been early warnings of more trouble ahead.
South Africa had objected, among other things, to the word “dignity,” apparently
fearing its implications for the apartheid system it was then constructing. And
Saudi Arabia had claimed that some of the so-called universal rights, particularly
the right to change one’s religion, were really just “Western” ideas.102

“The Soviet abstention, [Eleanor] Roosevelt believed, was attributable
mainly to one article that ‘they couldn’t possibly accept’: Article 13, which
provides that everyone has the right to leave his country.”103
The U.N. Charter’s several references to “human rights and fundamental
freedoms” and the UDHR’s specification of those rights and freedoms
marked a dramatic break—or, at least, the beginning of a dramatic break
—with the past: “Until World War II, most legal scholars and governments
affirmed the general proposition, albeit not in so many words, that
international law did not impede the natural right of each equal sovereign to
be monstrous to his or her subjects.”104 As Yale legal scholar Michael
Reisman has explained,
[T]he general assumption [prior to the end of World War II] had been that,
short of certain excesses, what a government did to its own people was, for the
most part, its own business. In 1942, for example, a member of the British
House of Commons characterized Adol[f] Hitler’s treatment of Jews of Allied
nationality as a matter of international concern but characterized the treatment
of Jews of Axis nationality as no one else’s business; it was a domestic matter.
Since 1945, that conception has, for the most part, changed. The basic proposition
of the contemporary international law of human rights is that a government
may no longer do anything simply because it is effective and promises to
achieve its purpose or enhance its power vis-à-vis its own population as long
as it is doing it only to its citizens and in its own territory. In order to qualify
for the name of government, a government now has to meet certain standards,
all of which involve restraints on the use of power: no torture, no brutalization;
no seizure of property; no state terror; no discrimination on the basis of race,

102. Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business,
44 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 8 (1999).
103. GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 22, at 170 (quoting Eleanor
Roosevelt, Representative of the U.S. on the United Nations Comm’n on Human Rights,
Making Human Rights Come Alive (Apr. 1, 1949), in WHAT I HOPE TO LEAVE BEHIND:
THE ESSENTIAL ESSAYS OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 559, 565–66, 573 (Allida M. Black ed.,
1995)).
104. Tom J. Farer & Felice Gaer, The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the
Beginning, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN’S ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 240, 240 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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religion, or sex; no prevention of people leaving a particular country, and so
on.105

In the postwar period, the plausibility of arguing that South Africa’s
racial apartheid—to name but one prominent example—was “no one
else’s business” would eventually disappear.106 Listen, in that regard, to
Thorbjorn Jagland, Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, in an oped in the New York Times, October 23, 2010, titled Why We Gave Liu
Xiaobo a Nobel:
The Chinese authorities’ condemnation of the Nobel committee’s selection
of Liu Xiaobo, the jailed political activist, as the winner of the 2010 Peace
Prize inadvertently illustrates why human rights are worth defending.
The authorities assert that no one has the right to interfere in China’s internal
affairs. But they are wrong: international human rights law and standards are
above the nation-state, and the world community has a duty to ensure they are
respected.
The modern state system evolved from the idea of national sovereignty
established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. At the time, sovereignty was
assumed to be embodied in an autocratic ruler.
But ideas about sovereignty have changed over time. The American Declaration
of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen replaced the control of the autocrat with the sovereignty of the people
as the source of national power and legitimacy.
The idea of sovereignty changed again during the last century, as the world
moved from nationalism to internationalism. The United Nations, founded in
the wake of two disastrous world wars, committed member states to resolve
disputes by peaceful means and defined the fundamental rights of all people in

105. W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated
Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 391–92 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
106. Cf. Henry J. Steiner, Twentieth Anniversary Reflections, Human Rights: The
Deepening Footprint, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 7, 12 (2007) (“There was a time in South
Africa when some protested that in and of itself, debate about apartheid in the U.N.
constituted unjustified intervention in violation of international law and of a long-standing
conception of state sovereignty. Those days are long distant; such a claim today would
be little short of ludicrous. That the earlier arguments now strike students as implausible,
even bizarre, constitutes striking evidence of the movement’s entrenchment. The prevalence
of this new discourse and its widespread institutionalization in [intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations], state governments, academia, and popular
debates bode well for the movement, despite its abundant problems. As ideas become
implanted, they inform and shape popular beliefs as well as popular visions of what may
be possible. They form part of the education of the young about the world they are
entering. Such ideas can animate, inspire, empower. They can generate criticism, protest,
and change. The ideals that gave birth to the movement, and the discourse expressing them,
continue as the movement’s most effective weapons.”).

808

[VOL. 50: 775, 2013]

The Morality of Human Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The nation-state, the declaration
said, would no longer have ultimate, unlimited power.
Today, universal human rights provide a check on arbitrary majorities around
the world, whether they are democracies or not. A majority in a parliament
cannot decide to harm the rights of a minority, nor vote for laws that undermine
human rights. And even though China is not a constitutional democracy, it is a
member of the United Nations, and it has amended its Constitution to comply
with the Declaration of Human Rights.107

The internationalization of human rights did not end in 1948 with the
adoption of the UDHR. Eighteen years later, in 1966, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted three treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), an optional protocol to the ICCPR—originally
referred to as “the Optional Protocol” to the ICCPR but now often referred
to as “the (First) Optional Protocol” because in 1989 the U.N. General
Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR—and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Together, the ICCPR and the ICESCR represent a sustained elaboration
of the rights more briefly articulated in the UDHR, which is not a treaty
but only what its name indicates: a “declaration.” By 1976, each of the
three treaties had attracted a sufficient number of state parties to enter
into force.108 As of March 2013, there were 167 parties to the ICCPR,
including, as of 1992, the United States; 114 parties to the (First) Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR; and 160 parties to the ICESCR. In 1989, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
“aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.” In 1991, the protocol entered
into force; as of December 2012, there were 75 parties to the protocol.
On the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, there is a list of five documents under the heading
“The International Bill of Human Rights”—the UDHR and the four treaties
referenced in the preceding paragraph: the ICCPR, the (First) Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and
the ICESCR.109 The ICCPR and the ICESCR are called “covenants”—
107. Thorbjorn Jagland, Op-Ed., Why We Gave Liu Xiaobo a Nobel, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2010, at A21.
108. An international human rights treaty typically enters into force, as among the
parties to the treaty, when a specified number of countries—a number specified in the
text of the treaty—becomes parties to the treaty.
109. Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (June 1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publicat
ions/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
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rather than “conventions,” which is the standard title for the other U.N.sponsored human rights treaties—to mark their singular importance, along
with the UDHR, as the foundational documents of international human
rights.
The treaties listed under the heading “The International Bill of Human
Rights” are not the only, or even the earliest, international human rights
treaties. Here, in the order in which they were adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly, is a list of the other principal treaties now in force,
along with their optional protocols now in force and the names of the bodies
responsible for monitoring compliance with them. The year each treaty
or protocol entered into force is indicated, as is the number of state
parties to each treaty and protocol as of March 2013.
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide—1951; 142 parties, including, as of 1988, the United
States—no monitoring body.
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination—1969; 175 parties, including, as of 1994,
the United States—Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women—1981; 187 parties but not the United States
—Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women—2000; 104
parties but not the United States—Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women.
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment—1987; 153 parties,
including, as of 1994, the United States—Optional Protocol
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment—2006; 67 parties but
not the United States—Committee against Torture.
 Convention on the Rights of the Child—1990; 193 parties but
not the United States110—Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in
armed conflict—2002; 151 parties, including, as of 2002, the
United States—Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution

110. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has more parties than any other
U.N.-sponsored human rights treaty. Only the United States and Somalia are not parties.
On the convention, see generally Ursula Kilkelly, The CRC at 21: Assessing the Legal
Impact, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 143 (2011).
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and child pornography—2002; 163 parties, including, as of
2002, the United States—Committee on the Rights of the
Child.
 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families—2003; 46
parties but not the United States—Committee on Migrant
Workers.
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities—2008;
130 parties but not the United States—Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities—2008;
76 parties but not the United States—Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities.
 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance—2010; 37 parties but not the
United States—Committee on Enforced Disappearances.111
To appreciate fully the breadth of the internationalization of human
rights in the second half of the twentieth century, it is important to
understand that the U.N. human rights system is not the only human
rights system. There are four transnational—or as they are often called,
regional—human rights systems: European, Inter-American, African,
and Arab.112
111. For a recent argument that the UDHR “and subsequent documents building
upon the UDHR’s mandate have not had identifiable impact on the structures of violence
and misery that continue to plague humanity,” see Ibrahim J. Gassama, A World Made of
Violence and Misery: Human Rights as a Failed Project of Liberal Internationalism, 37
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 407, 408 (2012).
Whatever measure of success they may claim has been in areas far from
those who most need the promises of the UDHR and its progenies. The numerous
covenants, conventions, treaties, agreements, protocols, resolutions, and other
similar indicia of accomplishments by lawyers and diplomats and activists
have not prevented recurring genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing,
widespread torture, famine, trafficking, and the like from happening. A world
of abject poverty, millions of people dying from preventable ills, environmental
exploitation and destruction, and unfettered violence remain a well-tolerated part
of our global order.
Id. at 456.
112.
Of the four, the European and the Inter-American systems are the most
developed. The newest of the four—the Arab human rights system—is the least developed.
For a succinct introduction to the regional human rights systems, see BUERGENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 12, at 160–373. For a lengthy study, see generally DINAH SHELTON,
REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2008). For an excellent set of materials on
the most developed of the four regional systems, see generally MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD
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Moreover, if the legal system of a country articulates and enforces
human rights, that legal system is, in part, a human rights system. Because
the legal system of Canada, for example, articulates and enforces human
rights, the Canadian legal system is, in part, a human rights system.113 And,
indeed, the legal system of virtually every country in the world articulates
and enforces, or purports to enforce, human rights: “Human rights are
enshrined in the constitutions of virtually every one of [the world’s] states
—old states and new; religious, secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern;
democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian; market economy, socialist, and
mixed; rich and poor, developed, developing, and less developed.”114

S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 2008).
Will there soon be a fifth regional human rights system? See generally Diane A.
Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law: Challenges to Evolution
Under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 268 (2011) (discussing the
issues related to “ASEAN Law” and concluding that these issues could impede
“Southeast Asia’s vast potential to contribute to the project of constitutionalizing
international law”); Yuval Ginbar, Human Rights in ASEAN—Setting Sail or Treading
Water?, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 504 (2010) (aiming to gain insight into the “promises, and
perhaps risks” posed by ASEAN by “chart[ing] regional human rights developments in
ASEAN and provid[ing] a brief overview of the key instruments adopted so far”); YungMing Yen, The Formation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights: A Protracted Journey, 10 J. HUM. RTS. 393 (2011) (analyzing the evolution of
ASEAN). “ASEAN” is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
113. Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is part of the Canadian
Constitution, articulates many human rights that are judicially enforced.
114. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, at ix (1990). As a practical matter,
however, that a right is enshrined in a constitution too often means little, if anything. See
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 865–72
(2013); cf. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and
the Role of Constitutional Constraints, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2012) (finding “strong
evidence of a systematic increase in rights violations in the United States and its ally
countries after 9/11”).
It is a promising development that over one hundred countries have established what
are known as National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs): administrative institutions
whose responsibilities include monitoring, and making recommendations with respect to,
the human rights situation in the country, including the country’s compliance, or not,
with its international commitments, and receiving and investigating complaints from
individuals and groups that their human rights have been, or are being, violated. On
NHRIs and their recent growth, see HUMAN R IGHTS , S TATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (Ryan Goodman & Thomas
Pegram eds., 2012). See generally Rachel Murray, The Role of National Human Rights
Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR
AND BEYOND 305 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010) (examining
the “place . . . occupied by NHRIs in the international human rights arena”); Thomas
Pegram, Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human
Rights Institutions, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 729 (2010) (exploring the interactions of NHRIs
with other institutional forms).
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